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Executive Summary 
"Europe as we know it is too weak, too slow, too inefficient." Emmanuel Macron's succinct verdict of 2017 
is still valid at the beginning of the new Twenties – and it is particularly relevant in the context of the slow 
joint EU response to the current corona crisis.  The corona crisis exemplifies a general lack of capacity 
to act of the European Union – both internally and externally. In terms of foreign policy, the European 
Union finds itself in a world in which it must be stronger and more sovereign if it wants to maintain a place 
in the global order that reflects its economic and cultural self-understanding as well as its ethical stand-
ards. Moreover, Europe is also in a weaker position internally. The formula of the "ever closer union" has 
always been more idealistic than the heterogeneous European reality. However, where in the past there 
was primarily resistance to further integration, today we observe real dissociation moves away from Eu-
ropean unity. 
Europe needs to change in order to persist in a changing world. Europe must become stronger internally 
in order to be strong externally. The premise of this paper and the underlying project "A strong Europe 
in a globalised world" is that this calls for a broad and honest discussion on future models for Europe. 
The current global public health crisis is one of several policy areas where the EU needs to become more 
effective. In the face of a crisis, however, the EU's other challenges should not be neglected, but should 
be approached with greater energy: Even though much attention is being paid to acute crisis manage-
ment, the other problems have not diminished. On the contrary, a new and major problem has emerged. 
All future tasks for Europe - Corona in advance - must now be tackled without delay. The scoping paper 
is intended as a first step on this path. It illustrates the internal and external challenges, problems and 
crises that the common Europe must face. 
The European Union in its present form is ill equipped to take on this task book. From an analysis of the 
past integration process, the common Europe emerges as a federal idea without a federal plan. Since 
the ideal has always been more popular than the practical ways to achieve it, actual European integration 
often proceeds very pragmatically and out of the situation, without following a "grand plan”. This situa-
tional integration model has reached its limits. A new model for Europe's future must be able to 
strengthen the Union both internally and externally and deal more constructively with the existing dispar-
ities between Member States. We formulate a number of test questions so as to gear the discussion of 
future models from the outset to the practical requirements of the coming Europe and outline a solution 
space. On this basis, we offer then a brief overview of the most important models currently under debate. 
The scoping paper paves the way for upcoming discussion. It does not claim to present already answers 
or a completely new model. This will be the task of the ongoing process. However, the focus of the latter 
cannot be limited to structural issues. At the same time, the policies of the European Union need to be 
re-examined. The joint consideration of "European public goods" and of future models corresponds to 
the duality of function and form. In the solution space for European future models, form and function must 
always be viewed together. 
The paper concludes with a plea to consider not only "full" future models. It will be at least as important 
to reflect on individual and partial proposals (e.g. Eurozone budget, EU army, European climate bank). 
The debate on the future of Europe will be stronger and closer to the reality of reform if it takes a prag-
matic approach whenever opportunities arise and the need is greatest. Whether giant leaps or small 
steps, all that matters is that it goes ahead. What matters is that more and more people come together 
and move forward for a Europe renewed in its traditional strengths and for its new challenges. This is the 
path taken by the project "A strong Europe in a globalised world."  
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A. The task of this scoping paper 1  
This paper is one of the impulses for a discussion process that the Bertelsmann Foun-
dation seeks to initiate on new models for Europe's future under the title "A strong 
Europe in a globalised world. This discussion has come to the fore, albeit involuntarily, 
due to the current corona pandemic. On the one hand, this crisis makes clear to what 
extent our societies and economies are interlinked, both with each other and globally. 
On the other hand, it shows that the Member States of the EU can only overcome this 
crisis together. 
The way in which this is to be done is currently the subject of intense debate. In addition 
to the immediate medical and epidemiological issues, financial and thus soon also fiscal 
tasks are currently in the foreground for Europe. Regardless of which financial instru-
ments are ultimately used in what combination, one thing is clear: the social and 
economic costs of the crisis will affect all EU states, and the fight against the coming 
recession will place a heavy economic and fiscal burden on each member state. How-
ever, the hesitant and sometimes divisive responses to the corona pandemic, especially 
in the first weeks of the crisis, have once again drastically revealed a fundamental flaw 
in European policy: it is not capable of acting with sovereignty and often reacts "too 
slowly, too weakly, too inefficiently". 
It is therefore of utmost importance to find the necessary common responses to the 
health crisis and the coming recession. But as big as these tasks are, that is not all. The 
corona crisis puts the other problems of Europe into perspective, but does not take an-
ything away from their absolute size (Thöne, 2020). It has added an additional, very 
large and acute problem. This has even increased the need to make progress in the 
discussion about the future form of a strong Europe and to strengthen Europe's ability 
to act both internally and globally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The current crisis 
exemplifies the 
EU’s general lack of 
capacity to act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The crisis only 
increases the 
urgent need for a 
comprehensive 
debate about the 
EU’s future 
In short: Europe must change if it is to survive in a changing world. It must change in 
order to set a powerful antithesis as a champion of European as well as universal values, 
at a time when these values are being attacked or recklessly undermined from many 
sides. The paper will argue that this calls for a comprehensive and honest discussion 
about future models for the common Europe. This discussion must continue to be con-
ducted in Brussels and Paris. But even more, it must be conducted in and with Tallin, 
Stockholm, Athens, Lisbon, Dublin, Warsaw, Vienna, Bucharest and the other European 
cities and regions. And it must be conducted intensively and actively in Berlin. Germany 
does not owe only this to itself. The European partners expect it from Germany. 
Discussion about 
future models for 
Europe is 
necessary – 
everywhere in 
Europe 
Also the citizens of Europe expect this from their national governments, from the Euro-
pean Parliament and from the EU Commission. The European elections in 2019 shook 
up the existing majority relations. At the same time, remarkable increases in voter turn-
out were recorded in many Member States, including Germany. Both are signs that 
politics in and for Europe can no longer be thought only along traditional lines. The great, 
but certainly not naive identification of people with Europe is just as much encourage-
ment as it is mandate to develop the participatory and subsidiary elements of a Europe 
of the people. The electoral results – despite all the difficulties in creating traditional 
majorities in the Parliament – thus point the way to open and solution-oriented discus-
sions of future models for Europe. The new EU Commission, headed by Ursula von der 
Leyen, has taken up this impetus from the European elections by launching a two-year 
EU election results 
commit Europe to 
more participatory 
policies 
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"Conference on the Future of Europe" in 2020, based on broad civic participation – and 
which it maintains in its basic outline also in the face of the corona crisis. 
The project "A strong Europe in a globalised world" is intended to give impetus to this 
debate and create a forum. The present paper argues that Europe must change in order 
to remain faithful to its liberal and multilateral values. Europe needs to become stronger 
in order to embody its values better both internally and externally. To be clear, we are 
not talking about strength through increased central power – in particular not about 
strengthening Europe at the expense of its Member States. European strength emerges 
where the principle of subsidiarity is followed and tasks with little European added value 
are (re-)allocated to national and regional levels. New strength always arises where bet-
ter decision-making ability and increased capacity to act take the place of institutional 
rigidities and mutual blockades. To achieve this, Europe must become more flexible, 
more permeable and, in the face of the rest of the world, more adaptable. Cherished 
European beliefs must also be reconsidered and adapted to the 21st century. The task 
of this first scoping paper is not to already formulate various conceivable future models 
and to tap into their strengths and weaknesses. Here we will first prepare the ground by 
providing an overview of the various external and internal challenges and by outlining 
where the traditional model of European integration has reached its limits. The demands 
on a future Europe outline a “solution space” that the further societal, academic and 
political discussion in Europe will have to explore. 
Europe must 
change to remain 
faithful to its values 
If Europe does not respond to the call for change so as to better meet its many chal-
lenges, this will not be the end of the European idea and the European Union. But both 
the European idea and the European Union will slowly fade away in a world that is not 
waiting for them and vis-à-vis the European citizens who can expect and receive more 
from them. This insight is suddenly very acute in the corona pandemic: if anything good 
could come out of this crisis, apart from all the suffering, then perhaps a greater insight 
and willingness to further develop and strengthen this Europe. 
Without an idea for 
the future, Europe 
will fade in a world 
that is not waiting 
for us 
B. Europe is challenged 2  
Europe is challenged, from the outside and from the inside. The world in and around 
Europe has changed a lot. The multilateral decades since 1990 under the stable domi-
nance of the North Atlantic Alliance have led to an increasingly multipolar world in which 
the divisive is again more clearly perceived than the common. Polarization is increasing 
also in Europe. 
 
The EU Treaty formula of an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” has al-
ways been more idealistic than the heterogeneous and not always harmonious 
European reality. Yet, in the past, we registered what was mainly resistance against 
overly progressive integration. Today, the discussion is about active revocation of inte-
gration steps reached and effective departure from the Union. Brexit offers the most 
drastic example here, but the erosion of common achievements is not confined to the 
United Kingdom. This is made evident not only by the increasing problems of maintain-
ing the rule of law and freedom of movement. Also the electoral successes of populists 
and nationalists in many Member States as well in the elections to the European Parlia-
ment are clear signs that the forces of disintegration are currently more present in 
Europe than those of integration.    
Currently, we see 
more disintegration 
than integration 
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At the same time, the European Union finds itself in a world in which it wants to be 
stronger – because its weakness is an important point of attack for EU opponents – and 
in which it must be stronger if it wants to maintain a place in the international order that 
corresponds to its economic and cultural self-image and also to its ethical aspirations. 
 
The geopolitical conditions for Europe's role in the world are currently changing. The 
long-lasting shifts in economic and political power around the globe gained new clarity 
since the Trump administration took office in 2017. Since then, the US has been trying 
much more offensively to change the rules of the game and to override them. In partic-
ular, from a European perspective, the associated weakening of the rule-based 
multilateralism is deplored. This becomes very clear with the resurgence of protectionist 
trade policies between the United States and China, temporarily between the United 
States and its North American neighbours, and increasingly also between the European 
Union and America. The rules of (relatively) free world trade, to which these WTO Mem-
ber States had committed themselves, only seem to gain recognition when they serve 
the Member States’ individual purposes, but no longer by virtue of themselves. 
Weakness of rule-
based 
multilateralism 
But multilateral rules are inherently weak. There is no stronger authority to enforce them 
than the respect they enjoy and the perception that they serve one’s own interests in the 
long run. Multilateral rules are strong as long as they are supported by strong actors. 
Behind the weakening of multilateralism is another, more fundamental geopolitical pro-
cess. After the end of the East-West conflict, the world was marked for over two decades 
by the unilateral – albeit not unchallenged – hegemony of the only remaining super-
power, the USA. The transatlantic alliance between the United States and Europe in 
economic, political and cultural terms provided the basis for the multilateralism that other 
geopolitical actors joined according to their own interest. This constellation is under-
mined by two factors.  
 
The role of the US 
as a world power is 
being questioned 
today:  
- China is growing 
as geopolitical actor 
- US-EU dispute in 
NATO and trade 
The rise of China as an economic power increasingly enables the People's Republic to 
strive also for recognition as a geopolitical actor. This is currently becoming evident with 
China's foreign policy in Africa and the numerous other infrastructure investments car-
ried out as part of the "New Silk Road". The second factor, on the other hand, is purely 
political. The increasing distance between the US and its European partners in the EU 
and in the NATO – which has been actively deepened by the Trump administration since 
it took office – has undoubtedly more profound causes than the narrow electoral victory 
of the Republican candidate, possible only under US electoral law, can explain. In addi-
tion to real and perceived imbalances in EU-US trade in goods and (digital) services, the 
still highly controversial distribution of defence expenditure on the occasion of NATO's 
70th anniversary is also a source of transatlantic dissent. Both factors exist inde-
pendently of the respective incumbent. In the light of a US foreign policy, which oscillates 
between isolationist impulses and an often single-minded hope to reach special "deals" 
for the US alone, these latent controversies have gained so much weight that the central 
European actors – in spite of all partnership – no longer want to rely on the US and its 
hegemonic solidarity as they used to.   
In this re-emerging multipolar world, Europe faces the task of developing the EU's global 
role into an independent pole of world politics in order to safeguard its interests and 
values. This desirable "capability for world politics" (J.-C. Juncker) calls for – as is cur-
rently being demanded above all in Brussels and Paris  a genuine sovereignty of the 
European institutions, which is more than a sovereignty derived from the Member States. 
Call for European 
sovereignty  
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What such a European sovereignty would have to encompass, which political, legal and 
then instrumental – e.g. military – preconditions would have to be created for it, is the 
subject of the ongoing debate. The European sovereignty demanded by French Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron in his celebrated 2017 Sorbonne speech does not correspond 
to the European sovereignty demanded by Jean-Claude Juncker, then President of the 
EU Commission, in his 2018 State of the Union speech. Also the elements of a common 
sovereignty for Europe, which Chancellor Merkel presented to the European Parliament 
in November 2018 as a long-term perspective to strive for, overlap partially with the other 
proposals. In other parts as well as in the underlying time conceptions, the ideas diverge 
significantly. Finally, the new Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stresses that 
one of the central tasks of her “geopolitical commission” (v.d. Leyen, 2019b) is to secure 
and expand European sovereignty. The substance as well as the boundaries of EU sov-
ereignty will still have to be determined. 
The competences and instruments ultimately needed for an externally sovereign Europe 
have not yet emerged from the current discussion. As central elements of European 
"world political capability", however, the following are repeatedly mentioned: 
How can Europe 
become more 
sovereign to the 
outside? 
 
 Own military decision-making and intervention capabilities in addition to NATO. 
 Independent European civil and military cyber security (including integration of intel-
ligence activities). 
 Strengthening the Euro as an international means of payment – also in order to 
become sanction-proof – e.g. through a European alternative to the international 
SWIFT system. 
 Strategic industrial policy with a view to the long-term technological competitiveness 
(or superiority) of key European industries and with the help of a more offensive, in 
line with strategic interests, screening of foreign, especially Chinese, direct invest-
ments. 
 Consolidation and strategic reflection of European development cooperation; also 
as a counterweight to Chinese foreign policy in Africa. 
 European climate and resource protection. 
This short list of geopolitical issues, with respect to which, according to many actors and 
observers, Europe in the multipolar world has to do more so as to successfully play its 
role in world politics, is not a complete enumeration of all the challenges facing the con-
tinent. This catalogue will undeoubtedly have to be reflected again in light of the corona 
crisis. Nonehteless, the strategic challenges mentioned below do not disappear in the 
face of corona, but are rather exacerbated. In what follows, we will deal in more detail 
with some of these challenges as well as with others that need to be addressed rather 
internally. It is not always possible to draw a clear distinction between external and in-
ternal challenges. This is evident in refugee and asylum policy, where the internal and 
external problems to be dealt with are equally part of a good European solution. How-
ever, in central respects, both internal and external challenges demand the same: in 
order to overcome them, Europe must be strong and capable of acting. 
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C. Europe as we know it is too weak, too slow, too inefficient 
If Europe is to act resolutely and independently in the multipolar world, it needs (though 
not logically and legally imperative) the original European sovereignty. Theoretically, this 
would also be conceivable if the European Member States were to pull together deci-
sively, move forward by consensus and unanimity and thus become the common 
European "pole" in the traditional intergovernmental model. This does not reflect Euro-
pean reality. Such a amicable “bottom-up world political capability” does not correspond 
to Europe as we know it and as President Macron described it in the abovementioned 
Sorbonne speech as weak, slow and inefficient. 
 
If one shares this view, the demand for European sovereignty is consistent. A Europe, 
which, in its traditional consensus-based model, musters too little decisiveness to the 
outside world, will be better able to take up the global challenges and overcome them in 
the Community sense by transferring original sovereignty to the central level. This is 
logical and, as Demertzis, Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, Wieser and Wolff (2018) point out, at the 
same time paradoxical: the call for a substantial strengthening of the European Union’s 
external position is getting especially loud at a time when this Union appears particularly 
weak internally and is showing real signs of dissolution with Brexit.  
External 
sovereignty 
demands internal 
sovereignty 
Yet, both phenomena converge where the question of future models for a stronger Eu-
rope is raised. "Sovereignty starts at home, and the same isolationist forces that 
undermine the global multilateral order undermine the European multilateral order.”1 Eu-
rope is therefore not faced with two different tasks, but with one big task. The internal 
and external challenges must both be solved simultaneously.  
 
Is this big task manageable for the 27 remaining members of the Union after the Brexit? 
To answer this question, two factors have to be distinguished. If the current weakness 
of the European Union is due to deep-seated political differences and persistent ten-
sions, a model for the future must be designed differently than if the primary problem 
lies rather in structural rigidities. 
Political differences 
or structural 
rigidities? 
For the Member States as well as for their citizens and enterprises, European integration 
has always been driven very strongly by economic integration into a common and then 
uniform market and by the freedoms associated with it.2 Participation in such an eco-
nomic integration can be designed in such a way that it is largely beneficial for all parties 
involved (Archick, 2018). However, even in the past, the harmony of interests on eco-
nomic matters could not mask differences in other areas. As already mentioned, the EU 
Treaty formula of an "ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" has always been 
in tension with the heterogeneous, rarely harmonious European reality. 
 
The first and most important controversy lies in the contrast between the Member States, 
which are pursuing the goal of an ever closer, and hence at some point federalist, EU, 
and the Member States, which value the looser intergovernmental character and do not 
want to go further. Next to geographic explanations, historical differences also play an 
Federal state 
versus 
confederation of 
states 
                                                     
1  Demertzis et al. (2018, S. 2). 
2  Even today, the economic dimension should not be underestimated. In a recent study published by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Mion and 
Ponattu (2019) show that, for every EU inhabitant, the added value of membership in the internal market is on average €840 per year. 
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important role. The rather integration-critical attitude of most Central European states 
belonging to the Visegrád Group, for example, is also ascribed to their shared experi-
ence of centralist control in the Warsaw Pact. 
Another controversy arises along the dividing line that eventually emerges in any federal 
entity: the contrast between rich and poor. In Europe, this distinction is often equated 
with the juxtaposition of net contributors and net recipients of EU funding. However, it is 
not only the differences between the interests of the relatively poor and the relatively 
rich Member States that must be borne in mind. Net-balance-thinking itself also influ-
ences European integration, since it means that the Union is perceived primarily as a 
"good" or "bad" deal for each Member State, depending on how much you pay to Brus-
sels and what you get back for it. From the point of view of the EU Commission and the 
European Parliament, the "juste-retour" logic is an obstacle to integration of its own 
(Büttner/Thöne, 2016). Many believe that this can be counteracted by less attributable, 
centralised financing via EU taxes. Alternatively, an agenda for more "European public 
goods" might tackle the problem even more directly at its roots. This is because the good 
spatial attributability of many of today's EU services follows from the fact that structural 
policy measures and the Common Agricultural Policy are regional or local public ser-
vices, rather than European public goods (Heinemann, 2016). Truly European public 
goods provided by the EU are, by their very nature, not attributable to individual Member 
States as "services received". Both strategies, EU-taxes and European public goods, 
are plain and consistent in their federal logic.3  
Nevertheless, the hope that, in another system, the representatives of the Member 
States would no longer have any idea whether they are “payers” or “recipients” in fiscal 
terms would be exaggerated. Along this distinction, albeit not deterministically, the ad-
vocates of stronger redistribution and their critics will continue to sort themselves out in 
the future. 
Net contributor 
versus net recipient 
 
European public 
goods 
The different fundamental attitudes of Member States towards the intensity and speed 
of European integration naturally influence the concrete positions taken on issues con-
cerning the further integration of the current EU. However, they also have an affect other 
matters, in particular the positions taken on the future enlargement of the European Un-
ion. The main focus here is on the six candidate countries in the Balkans (while the EU 
and its candidate country Turkey are now moving more and more apart, not by mutual 
agreement, but in a kind of mutual approval). Although the official commitments of Brus-
sels and most Member States to the progressive EU enlargement still sound optimistic, 
the six candidates increasingly perceive them as lip service (Archick, 2018). This be-
came clear with the decision to open accession negotiations with Northern Macedonia 
and Albania, which were only opened after a delay, although both countries had already 
met all the criteria required by the EU for this step at the European Council in October 
2019. 
Not least shaped by the experience of past enlargements, many of the EU Member 
States that are above average willing to further deepen integration have today adopted 
a rather critical stance towards enlargement. On the other side of the postulated contrast 
Deepening versus 
enlargement 
                                                     
3  There are many more good reasons in favour of an agenda to empower the European Union and gradually make it more sovereign by 
placing genuine European public goods at the focus of its tasks. They are at the heart of the Bertelsmann Foundations's project "A strong 
Europe in a globalised world," which is also the framework for the present paper. See also our parallel paper "European Public Goods. 
Concept for a Strong Europe" (Thöne/Kreuter, 2020). 
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“deepening or enlargement” are Member States wary of further integration. They may 
see their position buttressed by the heterogeneity of the Union increased by new mem-
bers and the subsequent slowdown of EU deepening. We can see this clearly in the 
case of the United Kingdom, which, even before the Brexit decision, has always shown 
great scepticism towards further deepening and, at the same time, – many say: therefore 
– has been one of the most prominent patrons of the on-going EU enlargement. With 
Britain's departure from the Union, the prospects of rapid full membership for candidate 
countries probably decline. 
The political heterogeneity of the Member States shapes the European Union in the 
same way as it has shaped the European Community in the past. On the other hand, 
the Acquis communautaire is an integration model that leaves only little room for heter-
ogeneity. The Acquis communautaire encompasses all rights and obligations that are 
binding for the Member States. These are first of all, as far as primary law is concerned, 
the EU Treaty and the EC Treaty, followed by the secondary directives, decisions and 
recommendations of the EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) as well 
as by the decisions of the European Court of Justice. On the occasion of the negotiations 
with Croatia (accession in 2013) and of the talks with the current candidate countries, 
the acquis was re-organised. Since then it can be summarised in 35 chapters and four 
fundamental freedoms. Successful accession and permanent EU membership presup-
pose that the acquis communautaire is recognised fully and irrevocably. The claim of 
"indivisible and irrevocable" is, on the one hand, a logical prerequisite for all EU states 
being members with equal rights and obligations. In the EU-enlargement, as well as 
among long-standing members, the Acquis is intended to prevent “cherry-picking” and 
two- or multi-class memberships.  
At the same pace 
versus selective 
participation 
The Acquis communautaire is not static. It changes as it grows. To put it bluntly: it only 
changes when it grows. The wave-like growth of common rights and obligations has 
brought European integration a long way forward, while the claim of "indivisible and ir-
revocable" produces a ratchet effect: new elements can be added to the Acquis, but old 
ones cannot be given up in practice. But this centripetal mechanism, which is actually 
supposed to strength integration, has gradually become a fetter, contributing to the Un-
ion's often lamented weakness and inefficiency. The ability to act only in one direction 
is not the kind of flexibility that suits the new tasks and challenges facing Europe and 
the European states. 
 
Even though the ratchet effect may appear so, the integration model of the Acquis is by 
no means the expression of a powerful Leviathan that systematically promotes the cen-
tralization of tasks at the European level. Behind the genesis of the European Union is 
perhaps the idea of a federal state. However, this idea is not underpinned by a federal 
plan as to how this multi-level state should be structured and what tasks the European 
level should receive. The absence of such a plan and the practiced situational acquisi-
tion of tasks in its place make the integration model of the Acquis appear historically as 
a method of dealing with the latent weakness of the European level vis-à-vis the individ-
ual states. 
Federal idea 
without a federal 
plan - 
Federalism versus 
functionalism 
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Infobox: Situational task acquisition, functionalism and European  
communitisation 
Europe is growing and changing through its tasks. New challenges must be met; existing public services must 
be provided more effectively or in a more sustainable way. In retrospect, a considerable part of the experienced 
European integration can be explained by situational, task-oriented needs for action and adaptation. In the recent 
past, for example, the Euro-Plus Pact, the European Semester or the regulations of the so-called "Six-Pack" 
were agreed because they had become necessary as situational reactions to the economic and financial crisis 
of 2009. For the EU and the Eurozone, new task dimensions were so opened up through intergovernmental 
treaties, without constitutional implementation being tackled at the level of EU treaties. The consolidation in the 
EU treaties can be implemented later, for example, within the framework of the often demanded, but controversial 
"fiscal union”. However, a catching-up embedment in the normative constitutional framework is not mandatory.  
The situational acquisition of tasks in the course of European integration portrays in its dynamics the communiti-
sation of tasks in the sense of Jean Monnet. It is reflected in the functionalism of David Mitrany (1943/1965), 
who at very early stage explicitly advised against planning integration projects according to normative goals. 
Instead of normatively and constitutionally overloading European integration from the outset, functionalism, true 
to the guiding principle "form follows function", seeks technocratic-pragmatic solutions to upcoming challenges 
or integration opportunities – confident that the situational functional requirements will lead to the right institu-
tional and contractual solutions. 
In a community developed on the basis of functionalism, institutions emerge along task packages. That is why 
functionalism is often presented as a counterpart to federalism. Under federalism, public tasks are assigned to 
existing levels of government. On the contrary, under functionalism, the required community institution is created 
out of the task. In the process of gradual integration, this means that, under functionalism, only one additional 
institution is ever created, whereas, under federalism, an additional task always requires the Community "overall 
package" to be redefined. It is obvious why the functionalist path to European integration seems easier to follow. 
The practical integration with the initial coexistence of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Military Alliance of 
the Western European Union (WEU) also illustrates the rapid successes of functionalism. 
However, an integration based purely on functionalist pragmatism entails the unconnected juxtaposition of 
numerous "functional pillars". To the extent that the latter were built according to different situational criteria, this 
leads to an increasingly opaque and democratically difficult to control conglomerate, which can trigger a 
regulative counter impulse. Historically, the functional integration achievements in Europe, beginning with the 
EC Merger Treaty of 1967, followed by the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, 
Nice and Lisbon, have been constitutionally consolidated and thus "federalised". However, significant 
expansions of the European task spectrum were, at first, still mostly functionally established. Examples include 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its predecessor, the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC), as well as the various forms of police and judicial cooperation. For these, the Lisbon Treaty then brought 
constitutional consolidation from 2009 onwards. Today, following the dissolution of the WEU in 2011, only 
Euratom still exists in the narrower EU circle alongside the European Union as a (formally) independent 
institution.4  
                                                     
4  With Brexit, the United Kingdom will leave also Euratom. 
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Nor should be underestimated that European integration has often made progress in 
response to regional and global crises, not as part of a longer-term plan: 
 
 The monetary crisis of the 70s went hand in hand with the emergence of the Euro-
pean Monetary System (1979). 
 The deregulation and liberalization of markets promoted by the US in the first half of 
the 80s and the simultaneous escalation of East-West tensions preceded the Single 
European Act (1987). 
 The unification of Germany speeded up the signing of the Treaty on the European 
Union (1992). 
 The EU enlargements and the rejection of the European Constitution in the French 
and Dutch referendum paved the way for The Treaty of Lisbon (2009). 
Whether the current corona crisis will also crystallize as such a incisive point in the his-
tory of European integration, remains to be seen. It depends largely on the answers that 
the EU develops in response to the crisis, and how decisively it will be able to implement 
them. As such, Europe is today more than ever called upon to overcome a substantial 
crisis of action that has closely interlinked internal and external reasons. For a long time, 
there has been growing evidence that the European structures of task performance and 
decision-making are no longer suited to meet the challenges ahead.  
Alternative forms of 
membership: 
The pressure to adapt European structures to modern challenges has built up over many 
years. In the conflict between integration-friendly and integration-critical interests, vari-
ous models have emerged which better reflect European realities than the goal of an 
ever-closer community. 
 
First in line (temporally) is the model of a "multi-speed Europe". It was proposed as early 
as 1974 by Willy Brandt and elaborated in 1975 in the Tindemans Report. At its core, a 
multi-speed Europe is to be understood as a response to the above outlined properties 
of the acquis communautaire. There, the pace of integration is dictated by the slowest. 
If one does not want to be dependent on veto positions or on objective obstacles to 
integration in individual Member States, a time-stepped procedure offers a first way out. 
Member States of the European Union that are ready and able to take further steps 
towards integration lead the way. The others will follow later. The concept provides that 
common targets will continue to be set for all Member States. The biggest project of a 
multi-speed Europe is the European Monetary Union. At the same time, it is a clear sign 
that the multi-speed formula can also serve as lip service. Some Member States, not 
only the United Kingdom, but also Denmark and Sweden, today show no discernible 
interest in ever joining the Monetary Union. 
- multi-speed 
Europe 
Talking about different speeds when the actual time horizon for some is “never” obvi-
ously makes little sense. As a logical consequence, the model of a “Europe of concentric 
circles" has emerged. Conceptually, this is tantamount to admitting that, in the long term, 
a single Union is no longer expected for all Member States. To the extent that concentric 
circles grant individual Member States derogations from certain Community policies in 
order to facilitate cooperation between the others, they tend to deepen integration. This 
can be illustrated by the example of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 
which brings together 25 of the remaining 28 members on armament issues and military 
- Europe of 
concentric circles … 
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force coordination. In addition to the United Kingdom, Denmark and Malta do not partic-
ipate in PESCO. 
Other central constellations – in which the EU 27 (after Brexit) operates at times with 
exceptions, at times with enlargements – can also be represented as concentric circles. 
Figure 1 illustrates the Euro area with its 19 members. The Schengen area is a special 
circle insofar as 22 EU members as well as four non-EU states participate in it. The 
European Economic Area (EEA) and the almost congruent European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) also extend the understanding of "circle" beyond a mere subset of the EU Treaty. 
Frankly, bringing together only "willing" EU members for certain tasks, but then possibly 
extending participation in these tasks also to willing non-members, sounds in practice 
something like a "Europe of clubs". 
… or Europe of clubs 
 
Europe today cannot be understood without taking into account the diversity with which 
many tasks are performed at a common level. Whether this way of acting via selective 
exceptions is to be regarded as a strength or a weakness of European integration de-
pends on the alternative scenario considered. Anyone who believes that only full 
cooperation between all EU Member States is the desirable European integration to be 
pursued will regard such partial solutions as a weakness of the Community process. On 
the other hand, those who focus on the role as veto player of the Member States not 
participating in the closer cooperation agreements will recognize as a strength of coop-
eration that with the help of exceptions it is possible to open up deeper fields for 
integration. 
Implications of 
selective 
participation 
But even if the concentric circles for European integration are interpreted positively, it is 
clear from the framework set by the Acquis that such a model has narrow limits. It works 
as long as at least the vast majority of Member States participate. In particular, all key 
actors (to which the UK, despite its size, has never belonged because of its tradition of 
ostentatious distancing) must be involved. Selective cooperation in which, for example, 
Germany or France do not participate is here practically inconceivable. Moreover, the 
model will only work within the framework of the existing European institutions if this type 
of selective integration itself remains the exception to a regular Community model in-
volving all Member States. Both these limits are becoming increasingly relevant. 
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European integration has essentially been driven by economic issues in the narrower 
and broader sense and by the fundamental freedoms associated with them. Even though 
the structures of the various European economies and the related interests of the re-
spective Member States were and are very different, the economic added value of 
operating in an integrated internal market has generally dominated these divergences. 
This corresponds to an integration model in which all EU states – with a few exceptions 
if necessary – regularly participate and in which other non-members as well as the ac-
cession candidates also want to participate.  
Clear added value 
of initial economic 
integration  
As pointed out by Demertzis et al. (2018), the use of the qualified majority rule in the EU 
Council also fits in well with this: as long as all Member States can benefit from integra-
tion decisions in the longer term, it will be easier for individual Member States to accept 
being outvoted occasionally in Brussels. On the other hand, many of today’s pressing 
issues for deeper European cooperation are not characterised by such a clearly discern-
ible added value, which makes it easier to lift any reservations. The attitudes of the 
Member States towards external military action vary widely. Also with regard to issues 
of immigration from outside the EU area, the interests in the European regions some-
times diverge considerably. There are occasional calls to abandon the unanimity rule in 
foreign policy as well (e.g. by Chancellor Merkel in a keynote speech before the Euro-
pean Parliament in November 2018). This recommendation, though, applies only “in the 
long term” and only “where the treaties make this possible and wherever it is possible“. 
This double containment of the visionary commitment to the majority rule also serves as 
a clear confirmation of the status quo for the near future. But increasingly, controversies 
are also to be expected in economic issues themselves. As the economic advantages 
of market integration and risk pooling have mainly been realised in the past, distributive 
issues of a common economy are increasingly coming to the fore. The political and me-
dia battles, which are fought solely on the basis of the evocative term "transfer union", 
vividly illustrate how controversial economic issues in Europe can become. 
Different positions 
on aspects of 
further integration 
The heterogeneity of the political issues relevant to the Union has grown considerably – 
also because other, non-economic issues have gained in importance. Here, the integra-
tion model, according to which the Member States – at most with a few exceptions – 
move forward together, increasingly leads to blockades and wait-and-see attitudes 
where action is required. This is reinforced by the centripetal integration model of the 
acquis communautaire, which blocks centrifugal tendencies, even if these are rather an 
expression of the idea of subsidiarity than a Brexit-like flight from the Union.  
„Europe, as we 
know it, is too weak, 
too slow, too 
inefficient“ 
The mechanisms that have made Europe an example of successful integration – as it 
must be clearly recognized today (despite all criticism on individual issues) – are in-
creasingly becoming obstacles to the flexible deepening and sovereign integration that 
Europe will need for tasks on its own continent and in the multipolar world of the 21st 
century.  
 
To reiterate President Macon's words: "Europe as we know it is too weak, too slow, too 
inefficient". The following Section takes a closer look at the major challenges facing the 
common Europe. It addresses the question: “Too weak for what?” 
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D. Challenges for a future Europe 
The need for reform is great in Europe because the pressure to act is great. The external 
challenges of the multipolar world call for a stronger, sovereign Europe. At the same 
time, internal challenges undermine this strength. Both dimensions require finding viable 
future models for Europe.  
 
Internal and 
external challenges 
 
Without claiming to be exhaustive, the following Section looks at some of the important 
internal and external challenges. What they all have in common is that the Union's tra-
ditional governance model, as described above, is here increasingly reaching its limits. 
The current corona pandemic clearly shows that components of health policy need to 
be more closely coordinated at European level. Elements of a common pandemic policy 
would at least include a substantial strengthening of the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC)5, clearly defined necessary supply chains of necessary 
medical materials, coordination of testing capacities. Above all, there will also have to 
be a more effective and faster joint response to the acute medical crisis: The European 
idea dies when - as was initially the case in northern Italy - many Covid patients die in 
one region because of overburdened clinics, while unused capacity is still available a 
few hundred kilometres away. 
Beyond the immediate health policy tasks, the fight against the economic recession 
caused by the forced standstill is currently beginning. In contrast to the global economic 
crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, Europe is entering this new 
crisis not entirely inexperienced in monetary and financial policy. Nevertheless, the com-
bination of globally symmetrical supply shocks and the ensuing depression in demand 
is presenting European economies and their common political governance with a new 
quality of as yet unforeseeable challenges. As the depth of the coming recession and 
the paths of economic recovery are not yet foreseeable at the time of writing, it is not 
possible to assess the repercussions on the public structures of the Member States and 
the Union itself. It is certain that public debt will skyrocket. In some of the Member States 
that are still burdened by the last crisis, some of which are heavily indebted, the loans 
that are still to be granted may well raise questions of debt sustainability and fiscal sol-
vency. In addition to averting critical peaks from these financial developments and the 
macroeconomic shocks behind them, one of Europe's central challenges will be to fur-
ther expand its economic and fiscal and monetary crisis resilience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pandemic 
prevention and 
control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corona recession 
and debt 
sustainability 
Another, equally long-lasting challenge is the reasonable and damage-minimizing set-
tlement of the Brexit. With the clear mandate from the House of Commons elections of 
12 December 2019, the British government has implemented the formal Brexit by 31 
January 2020. For London and Brussels this marks the end of the long hanging period 
and an orderly end to the first act. The necessary additional agreements can hardly be 
negotiated and adopted during the transitional phase currently limited to 2020. However, 
the negotiations regarding the transition period are currently on hold due to the corona 
crisis, which perpetuates the uncertainty about the nature and consequences of the 
 
 
 
Brexit continues to 
create uncertainty 
                                                     
5  The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has been based in Solna, Sweden, since 2005. 
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Brexit vote on June 23, 2016. Provisions have been made for further "drama" in the next 
act of Brexit.  
Even though in 2019 the focus will essentially be on the dysfunctional political process 
in London, it should not be forgotten that the lengthy Brexit process (with the associated 
uncertainty) poses enormous economic and political challenges to the EU and calls into 
question the existing integration framework. Since, especially among the widespread 
active "populists", little emphasis is placed on realistic cause-and-effect arguments, the 
economic damage of a disordered Brexit in the EU can certainly further strengthen EU 
critics and encourage them to follow the British example.  
Damage-minimizing 
Brexit 
In recent years, several EU Member States have been confronted with political changes 
that have threatened the rule of law and liberal democracy – core values on which the 
EU was founded (Article 2 of the EU Treaty). This development is particularly noticeable 
in Poland and Hungary and has intensified in both countries as part of the corona legis-
lation. The Hungarian government in particular has been criticised for using the Corona 
emergency laws of 11 March to undermine the democratic process. Thus the problem 
of the rule of law is being exacerbated by the corona crisis.  
Threat to the rule of 
law and to liberal 
democracy 
A suspension procedure under Article 7 of the EU Treaty has been initiated against both 
countries because of threats to judicial independence. However, the likelihood of one of 
the two countries actually losing its voting right because of suspension is very low, as 
this would require unanimous agreement among all other EU Member States (Archick, 
2018).  It should also be noted that the Polish and Hungarian governments regard EU 
measures as interference in their national sovereignty. This can further strengthen their 
already overt scepticism about further EU integration in some policy fields. Also in this 
context the EU is, therefore, faced with the conflict between "deepening or enlargement". 
 
The central geopolitical challenges for a future Europe are directly related to the weak-
ness of rule-based multilateralism outlined above and to the emergence of a new 
multipolarity (see Section B). The call for genuine European sovereignty or "capability 
for world politics" is the EU response to two trends: On the one hand, China's global 
importance is steadily increasing in many fields relevant to geopolitics - be it technolog-
ical and economic, be it diplomatic and military. On the other hand, the growing self-
confidence with which universal human and individual civil rights are portrayed as con-
structs of the "West" and devalued in comparison to a supposedly Confucian, but de 
facto primarily authoritarian concept of society, is a constant ideological challenge to 
Europe and its values. The fact that this debate is taking place against the background 
of close economic ties, many shared interests - e.g. in climate protection - and a very 
respectful way of treating each other does not detract from the challenge's fundamental 
nature. 
European 
sovereignty in the 
face of an 
increasingly 
hegemonic China… 
The other geopolitical benchmark of a European aspiration for greater sovereignty is the 
United States. Here the constellation is, at first glance, reversed. The United States and 
Europe together form the foundation of this very "West". The bond goes deep. A shared 
history and values, intensive trade relations, closely intertwined military security and, 
last but not least, a popular culture that is in some respects virtually amalgamated give 
Europe's relationship with the United States an almost sibling-like appearance. This im-
age of a close family might correspond to the at times shrill tone of their interactions and 
a certain tendency on both sides to be easily disappointed with each other in the face of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… and a certain 
hegemonic fatigue 
of the US 
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(too) high expectations. But the European-American relationship does not depend on 
the atmosphere of communication, but on the strength of common interests. 
Here, Europe is confronted with two American trends, both of which suggest a loosening 
of this geopolitical alliance. On the one hand, the transatlantic relationship is almost 
inevitably losing importance for the US as transpacific relations gain in relevance. The 
growing dominance of Californian high-tech companies in American foreign trade also 
plays a major role here. This change in Europe's significance for the United States is 
reflected in the clearly stated - and long justified - demand that the costs of military se-
curity within NATO be shared less unevenly. The second trend is also evident in this 
question of burden sharing. Underpinned by an isolationism that has grown strong over 
the decades but is now also very prominently positioned, the United States is showing 
a certain hegemonic fatigue. This trend is deeply rooted. To put it in a nutshell, with the 
fading of the "American dream" for the middle classes in the US (Ca¬se/Deaton, 2020) 
its sense of mission as the former "world policeman" seems to have waned, too. For 
more than twenty years American foreign policy has often been merely reactive and 
essentially follows a "no strategy approach" (Walt, 2020). This trend is further reinforced 
by the Trump administration's erratic foreign policy, which is primarily based on show 
effects aimed at domestic politics, and which is now actively undermining American rep-
utation in the world. 
Europe must navigate between these two poles, the USA and China. It must also 
(re)conquer its own place in this constellation. Whether this will be more difficult or a little 
more easy after the Corona crisis is not yet clear. Either way, it will not be easy. This is 
because the argument also put forward in this paper that a new multipolarity is increas-
ingly replacing rules-based multi-lateralism in geopolitics is still optimistic in one respect 
and formulated from a European perspective: Europeans speak of multipolarity. In the 
USA and also in China there is growing talk of an increasingly bipolar world. Europe - 
like Russia and the emerging countries - is perceived as an important player, but not as 
an equal power pole. 
Multilateralism 
versus 
multipolarity...  
 
...or multipolarity 
versus bipolarity? 
Insofar as this - not uncontroversial - view reflects geopolitical realities, the challenge for 
the future Europe on the path to greater sovereignty is twofold: the (re)attainment of rule-
based multilateralism should continue to be the goal of European policy, because it of-
fers fairer, more participatory and in some respects also efficient global governance. But 
the path to this goal will first have to lead via a multipolarity in which Europe is strong 
enough to formulate and enforce the demand for multilateral rules as a partner of equal 
standing. Even a revitalisation of close transatlantic ties with the United States will hardly 
succeed if Europe continues to strive for the role of the (not only financial) junior partner. 
It is clear, however, that the claim to achieve renewed multilateralism and better part-
nership from a position of growing strength must also be backed by real substance. 
Europe will not become stronger by merely demanding more power. Geopolitically, 
power is based on real significance, capacity to act and the will to act. Without signifi-
cance, the other two factors will not help. This describes the situation of some parts of 
the world - but not of Europe. Europe does not lack economic, cultural and normative 
importance. In some fields Europe is even the decisive "world power" - just take the so-
called Brussels effect for an example.6 But making better use of this great potential by 
Europe will not 
become stronger by 
merely demanding 
more power. 
                                                     
6  The "Brussels effect" describes the unilateral adoption of EU legal norms, regulatory measures and standards in large parts of the world, 
especially - but not exclusively - where transnationally traded goods and services are concerned. The term was formulated in 2012 by Anu 
Bradford (Columbia Law School); see currently Bradford (2020). 
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expanding Europe's capacity to act and thereby strengthening its will to act is the goal 
of European sovereignty. It can be achived – but only through structural reform of the 
Union. This shows that, particularly in Europe's relations with the USA and China, new 
models for Europe's future cannot be separated from the Union's central geopolitical 
tasks for the future. 
In addition, Europe's strength grows with the quality of how it masters its other chal-
lenges. In foreign policy, relations with its large eastern neighbour have traditionally 
played a central role. Russia's international policy has taken an increasingly aggressive 
tone in recent years. Following the repeated disruption of gas supplies to the West and 
the Russian-Georgian war in summer 2008, the EU was forced in March 2014 to impose 
restrictive sanctions against Russia in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and 
continued interference in eastern Ukraine. Russian disinformation efforts, attempts to 
influence elections in Europe and in the US, Russian actions in Syria, cyber threats, 
money laundering activities, and multiple human rights abuses have further impaired the 
relationship. 
Russia’s aggressive  
foreign policy 
There exist different views among EU countries about how to deal with Russia in the 
long term. Many Member States have intensive trade relations with Russia (e.g. Ger-
many and Italy) and rely on Russia to meet their oil and gas needs. These countries are 
committed to maintaining relations with Russia, also with a view to European security. 
Other EU countries – Sweden, Denmark and the Baltic States – favour a tougher stance 
towards Russia, alarmed by the increase in Russian manoeuvres, by the dependence 
on Russian gas ("Nord Stream 2") and by Russian media soft powers. As a conse-
quence, it has not yet been possible to agree on a successor to the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the Russian Federation, which expired in 
2007.  
 
Following the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, large differences in income and stand-
ards of living between the new Member States and the EU-15 prompted an impressive 
surge in intra-European migration. First, strong migration arose from the eight countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 to Ireland and the United Kingdom, which, together with Swe-
den, had opened their borders immediately, without a transitional period. Then, there 
was extensive migration from the Member States that joined in 2007 - Bulgaria and Ro-
mania - to Italy and Spain. Finally, with the Eurozone-crisis starting in 2010, people 
moved from southern Member States – Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece – to northern 
Member States – especially, Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Migration flows and 
refugee crisis 
In addition to internal flows, the EU is also experiencing large migratory dynamics related 
to the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa as well as to the population explosion 
in some countries of sub-Saharan Africa. According to IOM data, more than one million 
refugees and irregular migrants arrived to Europe in 2015. Also as a result of the deal 
between the EU and Turkey and of the agreement between Italy and Libya, the inflow 
fell sharply in subsequent years. In 2018, it dropped to 139,000 refugees, and in 2019 
to 120,000 refugees per year. 
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The Dublin regulation envisions that refugees and irregular migrants must apply for asy-
lum in the EU country where they first enter. This rule contrasts with Article 67 TFEU7 
and sets an unfair burden on Member States, which have already hit by the Euro-crisis 
and are geographically closer to the war-torn countries or to the North African shores. 
The EU has made efforts to attempt to relocate refugees into other member countries 
(2015 Emergency Relocation scheme), but these turned out to be insufficient and strug-
gle with the open resistance of some countries (Austria and the Visegrád group) or with 
the failure to comply with the Dublin Regulation by other Member States. 
Though migration inflows meet, at least with a view to sheer quantities, the demand for 
labour in Western Europe and help to address its ageing problem, they pose important 
challenges for labour markets and welfare systems of receiving countries. Also in 2019, 
there is no sign of an attenuation of the smouldering controversies among EU states on 
migration issues. Wih the uniletaral cancellation of the EU-Turkey deal by President Er-
godan and the fragile ceasefire in Idlib, these controversies can also break out again at 
any time. Of the 5.7 million people who have fled Syria since 2011 according to UNHCR 
figures, around one million have come to Europe to date, but there are still around 3.6 
million Syrians in Turkey. 
 
Since the September 11 attacks, America and Europe have been confronted with trans-
national Islamist terrorism. The tactic of global expansion has been and continues to be 
used by various groups (including ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah) as a revolt against 
the claimed hegemony of the secular world powers. The response to the terrorist attacks 
through war, the partly still poor integration of Muslims in European societies and the 
diffusion of communication systems like Twitter and Facebook have exacerbated the 
threat of terrorist attacks. Since 2007, EU countries have innovated various information 
exchange mechanisms aimed at optimizing the fight against terrorism and at preventing 
money laundering (EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report). Yet, an effective re-
sponse requires a deep understanding of the complexity of the phenomenon. The victory 
over ISIS in Syria in 2019 is no guarantee that the terrorist threat to Europe will diminish; 
new risks may arise from “fighters” streaming back. 
Global terrorism 
Climate change has already caused the average surface temperature on Earth to rise 
by more than one degree Celsius since the Industrial Revolution. This development will 
have serious consequences for human health, biodiversity and resources, ecosystems, 
and many social and economic sectors, including agriculture, tourism and energy pro-
duction. 
Climate change 
The European Union is at the forefront of international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and thus safeguard the planet's climate. EU climate policies have been de-
veloping since 1990, when the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change issued its first report. In 1997, the then-European Community signed up to the 
Kyoto Protocol and the EU subsequently joined the 2015 UN Paris Agreement. 
 
Yet, the attention devoted by the EU, in the field of environmental protection, to the 
definition and update of its objectives, legal principles, multiannual action programmes 
 
                                                     
7  Article 67 TFEU: The Union “shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, 
immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals”. 
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and impact assessment procedures is counterbalanced by external and internal con-
straints to the implementation of such a policy. Not only the EU has to deal with the lack 
of commitment by major international actors, but its scope for action is also limited by 
Treaty rules, in particular: the requirement for unanimity in the Council. Moreover, there 
is the difficulty of ensuring that Member States comply with the rules laid down at the 
Community level and the need for controversial public policy interventions – for example, 
the introduction or increase of carbon prices – if the goals set out in the Paris agreement 
are still to be attained. 
These are by far not all challenges facing European policy today. As primarily economic 
issues, the strengthening of the Euro as an international means of payment and a stra-
tegic industrial policy with a view to the long-term technological competitiveness of key 
European industries (including screening of foreign direct investment) are also high on 
the agenda. Immediately behind follow very fundamental challenges such as the pro-
gressive coping with and shaping of the fourth industrial revolution and the ever more 
important cyber security. Nor should the still smouldering conflicts surrounding the topic 
“Eurozone and public finances” be taken lightly. 
Economic policy 
challenges 
In their sum and structure, these challenges are now too great to be met by the traditional 
EU voting and governance model. This does not rule out the possibility that the previous 
model "performs well" in individual areas. The EU 27, for example, has made a good 
impression in the Brexit negotiations. However, it is hardly to be expected that other 
challenges will create a similarly unifying thrust as the often self-centred and at times 
sickening behaviour of the British government has unintentionally but very effectively 
accomplished for the EU. Thus, in order to be able to act flexibly and energetically over-
all, the EU needs a new governance model. 
 
E. Check points for further European development  
How should a future European model be designed if it is to meet these challenges? What 
criteria must a future model for Europe fulfil? The project “A strong Europe in a globalised 
world" will explore these questions and seek to answer them.  
 
In order to shed light on the possibilities and limits of new models for Europe, we first 
formulate practical thought experiments. They are expressed as questions that are not 
yet to be answered in this paper. The task of the thought experiments is to put a discus-
sion process about future models into practice and so “ground it”. The questions are 
intended to help assess whether, in a new model, the grass not only appears greener 
from the other side of the fence, but also is greener when you actually stand on it. 
Check points as 
tests for European 
future models 
The questions of the thought experiments aim at a voluntary and sustainable acceptance 
of the mentioned measures. It is  not a matter of which model could best be used to 
force the Member States to adopt one of the solutions: 
 
 How can the UK (after Brexit) continue to participate as a full member in a European 
security and defence structure? 
 How can the monetary union be complemented by elements of a fiscal and social 
union so as to ensure that the macroeconomic governance of the Euro area stands 
on “both feet”? 
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 How, and with which decision-making mechanisms, will the EU become more “world 
politics capable”? 
 How can the EU better absorb external shocks than was the case during the 2015 
refugee crisis or is now in the beginning of the corona crisis? How can the EU guar-
antee fair burden-sharing and implement it more effectively?   
 How, and according to which roadmap, can the EU offer candidate countries (espe-
cially in the Western Balkans) a realistic integration perspective, up to full 
membership? 
 How can the EU offer Member States also possibilities of partial disintegration as an 
alternative to complete withdrawal? With which incentive structure can such a partial 
disintegration be made “expensive” enough but not impossible? 
 
 How can the EU strike a balance of the current positions within the EU, for example 
between net contributors and net recipients, between South and North, and between 
East and West? 
 
 How can the needs of European citizens be better taken into account? Through 
which processes and by what means can the “citizens’ will” be better integrated into 
European decision-making processes? 
 
These questions are not intended to be an exhaustive list. Nor is it about answering all 
questions positively for the "best" model. Here, ambiguities and trade-offs are inevitable. 
Whether they are answered positively or negatively – either way, such thought experi-
ments help to ensure that the future models for Europe are not viewed exclusively in 
terms of their constitutional consistency or other abstract criteria. The thought experi-
ments force us to view the quality of future models from the outset as solutions to real 
European policy issues. 
Concrete instead of 
abstract solution 
approaches. 
F. Solution space  
Europe must reform itself in order to be able to develop further. The title of the project 
"A strong Europe in a globalised world" does not only refer to the EU in its present form; 
it is about new future models for Europe. In winter 2019/20 - when the new EU Commis-
sion has just been sworn in, the EU Parliament has been operational for a few months 
after the elections and the Brexit has been postponed once again - such a perspective 
has already almost been common good. In the media, in science and in politics – na-
tional as well as European – it would be difficult to hear voices expressing continuous 
satisfaction with the status quo of the European model. The corona crisis does not move 
these questions to the background, but rather shows the deeper-reaching needs for for-
ward-looking reforms ever more clearly. 
 
The great willingness to discuss reforms of the European Union, however, does not 
mean that there is agreement on a direction or even on the objective. With regard to the 
internal and external challenges, there are sometimes major divergences between the 
Member States in key policy issues.  
To some extent, these differences also reflect the division of the European public into 
confident and insecure EU citizens, as revealed by the eupinions 2019/1 survey in the 
run-up to the European elections. Economically and above all socially insecure EU citi-
zens are largely dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy at the EU level and with 
Different opinions on 
the state and 
development of the 
EU 
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the political development of the EU (de Vries and Hoffmann, 2019). The confident re-
spondents, on the other hand, are rather satisfied with the functioning of democracy at 
EU level and the political orientation of the EU. Here, too, the unifying factor seems to 
be the unease with the structural status quo: according to the survey, only 36 percent of 
those who are confident believe that "the EU is developing in the right direction". Of the 
socially insecure EU citizens, only 23 percent express this view. The result of the EP 
elections in May 2019 can also be understood in this sense: both EU critics – “populist” 
or conventional – and very convinced EU supporters have gained more votes. Above 
all, however, voter turnout has increased enormously and surprisingly: Europe is inciting 
people stronger. Europe’s future moves people. In this respect, the election results – 
despite all difficult arithmetic of stable majorities – strengthen the obligation to embark 
on an open discussion on future models for Europe. 
Thus, EU sceptics and supporters alike say that Europe must be reformed. This – for 
the time being empty – formula can also be agreed upon in politics by integration sup-
porters and critics. Of course, the two sides hardly strive in the same direction. But even 
in view of disparate and potentially even more divergent reform wishes, a basic thesis 
of the project "A strong Europe in a globalised world” is that the intersection of possible 
reforms, most of which can be recognized as progress, is not empty. Euroscepticism 
does not only arise from nationalistic attitudes that are averse to the idea of community. 
Euroscepticism can also stem from the disillusionment caused by the weakness, slow-
ness and inefficiency of the Union. The more capable and successful Europe becomes 
through reforms, the less reason there is for scepticism and distancing. 
The EP election 
result is a clear, 
albeit difficult, 
reform mandate   
This constellation is a good, by no means self-evident starting point for the necessary 
reform debate on structural future models for Europe. But it must also urge a certain 
caution. Structural reforms can help to solve structural problems. This must be separated 
from the occasional tendency, when dissatisfied with the results of the political process, 
not to criticize the opinions and majorities expressed therein, but to raise directly the 
fundamental question of the functioning of the political system as such. European policy 
in particular can give rise to this kind of dissatisfaction if dissent between the Member 
States results in urgent questions not being answered or being answered only insuffi-
ciently. 
Yet, not every unsatisfactory policy outcome amounts to a system failure. This would 
only be the case if, in a different European model, the same actors would not come to 
the same unsatisfactory results. Yet, when viewed realistically, one would have to expect 
frequently that the same actors would also achieve similar results in alternative configu-
rations as long as their political positions or interests remain unchanged. In such cases, 
the search for alternative models must lead to disappointment. They, too, cannot offer 
redemption from the subjectively unsatisfactory outcome of the political process. We 
want to take advantage of this distinction in the project "A strong Europe in a globalised 
world". New future models for Europe should not only serve the perception that the pro-
verbial grass on the other side of the fence is greener. The grass should actually be 
greener. The same political actors should be able to achieve different, better results in 
a new model. 
 
 
 
In new future 
models, the grass 
should actually be 
greener  
In the further project, it is necessary to map a solution space for future models and to 
locate existing model proposals as well as further developments and completely new 
proposals in this space. From today's perspective, the solution space is quite well filled 
already, if one takes in all models that are available in principle and that have already 
Existing model 
proposals as a 
starting point for the 
discussion 
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been suggested. For example, the European Commission presented five scenarios in 
its 2017 White Paper on the Future of Europe, four of which – i.e. after deducting sce-
nario 1 “Carrying on” – can be regarded as reform models. The solution space is, thus, 
already populated at least by (not ranked): 
 „Nothing but the single market“: the EU gradually returns to the single market (sce-
nario 2 in the White Paper). 
 
 „Those who want more do more”, i.e. Europe of concentric circles: the maxim of 
homogenous integration in the acquis communautaire is abandoned in order to en-
able Member States with different integration capabilities to deepen integration in 
individual policy areas (Scenario 3 in the White Paper). 
 
 „Doing less more efficiently“: The EU focuses on selected policy areas so as to 
achieve here quick results, but reduces its role in other policy areas (scenario 4 in 
the White Paper). 
 
 „Doing much more together“: the Member States decide to do much more together 
in all policy areas (scenario 5 in the White Paper). 
 
 Multi-speed Europe: only the temporal unity of the acquis communautaire is given 
up; groups of Member States can deepen integration, while the other Member States 
commit themselves to taking these integration steps at a later stage. 
 
 United States of Europe: the EU becomes an autonomous and sovereign territorial 
entity, and the states become federal countries within the EU. 
 
 Europe of Clubs: there is no "supreme form of European integration"; instead, dif-
ferent Member States join to form policy-based "clubs", the basis of which is a 
reduced, generally binding Acquis communautaire. 
 
 Functionally enhanced Europe of Clubs: the model takes up the flexibility concept 
of a club model and supplements the mechanisms in the functionalist perspective 
discussed above, which has played a major role in past European integration. In the 
form of "functional pillars" would be organized, for example, such tasks, which Mem-
ber States of the European Union want to implement together with non-members as 
equal partners. 
 
These model proposals essentially differ in two dimensions: firstly, between "more Eu-
rope" and "less Europe" and, secondly, whether and how the future models involve all 
or specific Member States. Bringing such model proposals together with the current and 
future challenges facing Europe, it quickly becomes clear that the definition of the right 
EU competences is at the heart of considerations. The emerging discussion on “Euro-
pean public goods” is moving in this direction (see e.g. Fuest and Pisani-Ferry, 2019). 
This perspective - including that of the project "A strong Europe in a globalised world" - 
aims to classify current and future EU competences on the basis of the economic anal-
ysis of fiscal federalism and, from there, to identify inclusive reform perspectives that 
integrate political and legal as well as economic and social aspects. The focus on Euro-
pean public goods and future models for the EU corresponds to the duality of function 
and form. The two must go together. The present paper has shown, among other things, 
that the genesis of the European constitution has by no means consistently reflected the 
simple motto "form follows function". Whenever future models define European compe-
tences, shape sovereignty and, not least, constrain and control power, form cannot 
simply follow function. Nevertheless, the form – the future model – lives only by enabling 
the function – be it an established EU task, be it a European public good – to be fulfilled 
 
Future models for 
the EU and 
European public 
goods are, 
respectively, "form 
and function" in the 
upcoming design 
question 
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optimally. In the solution space for European future models, form and function must al-
ways be seen together. 
At the same time, the conceptual claim should be kept in check. The solution space 
should be framed as a place where not only "full" future models are depicted, designed 
and discussed. At least as important are individual proposals and institutions, such as 
the Eurozone budget, Chancellor Merkel's long-term aspiration of a European army or 
President Macron's proposal for a European climate bank. Here, the Macron-Merkel-
proposal of May 2020 for a debt-based and transfer-oriented European reconstruction 
fund joins the ranks, albeit in a much larger format. 
It is in this spirit that the "Conference on the Future of Europe", initiated by the Commis-
sion and the European Parliament and supported by the Council, will seek to launch 
numerous civil society debates on the renewal of the Union from 2020 onwards. This 
conference should not be marginalized by the Corona crisis - although more digital for-
mats of gathering should be found in the initial period. With climate change, social 
justice, digital change, the strengthening of the Union's democratic structures and the 
like, the conference will focus on key issues affecting people. Solutions are sought for 
tangible problems, not necessarily for the entire model.  
Not only „big“ future 
models, but also 
partial building 
blocks 
The focus on building blocks that are not fitted into a certain future model from the outset 
takes up the mechanisms of situational task acquisition. As experience has shown that 
reforms are more successful if they do not want to change content and form at the same 
time, the discussion of future models must not be limited to considering the "big picture". 
 
This is not a plea for utter modesty. Yet, the discussion on the future of Europe will be 
stronger and closer to the reality of reform if it takes a pragmatic approach and identifies 
where opportunities present themselves and where the need is greatest. 
 
Whether giant leaps or small steps, all that matters is that it goes ahead. What matters 
is that more and more people come together and move forward for a Eu-rope renewed 
in its traditional strengths and for its new challenges. This is the path taken the project 
"A strong Europe in a globalised world." 
Big or small steps, 
as long as it goes 
ahead 
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